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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Evolution of the Regime of Tutorship in Louisiana
A study of the development of the law of tutorship in Louisi-
ana reveals that the legal treatment of the orphaned minor's
status in society has constantly changed. The original concept
of tutorship, based on the old Spanish regime, was greatly altered
in the nineteenth century through the influence of the Code Civil,
and more recently by innovations of equal importance. An an-
alysis of this development should prove helpful in promoting an
understanding of the law of tutorship as it exists today and
should be of aid in the event revision of this area of the law is
considered in the future.
The Spanish Provisions
The first significant law in Louisiana on the subject of tutor-
ship was the system provided by Spain' in Las Siete Partidas.2
The Partidas defined tutorship as "the guardianship which is
given and conferred over minors of free condition [sui juris]
who are under fourteen years of age, when they are males, and
under twelve years, when they are females, as being incapable
and not knowing how to defend themselves."'3 This definition
provided two prerequisites to the regime of tutorship, first, that
the minor be of free condition and, second, that he be below the
age of puberty. To be "of free condition" the authority of the
father over the minor must have terminated; the death of the
mother had no effect upon the status of the child.4
1. There is no apparent direct connection between the pre-Spanish French law
in Louisiana and subsequent systems of tutorship. The great French influence in
tutorship came only after the Code Civil. See page 417 infra.
2. La8 Siete Partidas, written in 1256, and promulgated as law in 1343, be-
came the basic law of Spain in 1505. In varying degrees the Partidas was the
law of Louisiana from the Spanish acquisition in 1769 to the second quarter of
the nineteenth century. In 1820 it was still considered in effect in Louisiana
despite the Digest of 1808, and for that reason the Legislature commissioned its
translation. The origin of many of the present articles of the Civil Code and the
Code of Practice lies in the Partidas. All quotations of the Partidas in this Com-
ment are from the official Moreau-Lislet, Carleton translation of 1820.
3. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 6.16.1. The definition is similar to that of the Insti-
tutes of Justinian. "Tutelage, as Servius defined it, is a right and power exer-
cised over an independent person, given and allowed by the civil law for the
protection of one who on account of his tender age is not able to be his own
defender." INSTITUTES 1.13.1. Translation by LEE, TnE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN
LAW 91 (3d ed. 1952).
4. Indeed, in the early Roman law the woman was deemed a subject of per-
petual tutorship. On the perpetua tutela mulierum, see BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK
OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 165 (2d ed. 1950); JoLowicz,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 120 (1932); LEE, TiE
ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 88, 344 (2d ed. 1952).
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The Spanish concept of "paternal authority" embodied in Las
Siete Partidas may be traced to the Roman family organization. 5
At Roman law the oldest surviving male was the pater familias,
the head of the family." He alone of the family was considered
sui juris, that is, as having a legal personality; those under his
control were alieni juris and were necessarily without legal per-
sonality. 7 The power which the oldest male exercised over the
family was called the patria potestas and was almost dictatorial
in nature.8 So long as there existed an older male in the direct
ascending line, persons under his control remained alieni juris
regardless of their age.9 Those under the control of the pater
familias could acquire a legal personality only at the termination
of the patria potestas.'0 Thus if the patria potestas terminated
while one was below the age of puberty, although he then became
sui juris, he also became subject to the rules of tutorship. 1 After
puberty, the minor could act through a curator if he chose to
do So.12
This Roman background was evident in the Spanish law in
force in Louisiana. Under it, the r6gime of tutorship began when
the child was no longer under paternal authority and continued
until the minor reached the age of puberty. Between the age of
puberty and the age of majority the child was subject to a less
5. See LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 4.17, 18. On patria poteata8 at Roman law, see
INSTITUTES 1.9, 12; BUCKLAND, A TExTBooK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS
TO JUSTiNIAN 102 (2d ed. 1950) ; JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 118-20, 248-49, 522-23 (2d ed. 1952).
6. INSTITUTES 1.9.3; see note 5 supra.
7. See INSTITUTES 1.9, 12; note 5 supra.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. INSTITUTES 1.13.1. See note 3 supra.
12. Curatorship was a later development in the Roman law than tutorship.
The ln plaetoria of the second century B.C. took the first step away from the
concept that a youth was legally capable of handling his own affairs as soon as
he had reached the age of puberty. This statute, which permitted an action
against anyone taking advantage of the inexperience of a man under 25, had
the effect of making people wary of dealing with minors. When the praetors began
to grant reatitutio in integrum to minors who had acted unwisely, dealing with a
minor became even more perilous. However, if the minor obtained the advice of
an experienced adult, he could not bring the actions based upon his own inex-
perience. Thus persons wishing to transact business with minors began to re-
quire that they obtain the advice of an adult and experienced man. Later the law
allowed permanent curators, as these advisors were called, to be appointed by the
minor.
For a thorough discussion of the institution of curatorship in Roman law, see
BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS To JUSTINIAN 168
(2d ed. 1950); JOLOwICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN
LAW 251 (2d ed. 1952).
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stringent form of guardianship - curatorship.'8 This continued
to be the law of Louisiana until 1830 when the curatorship of
minors was abolished and the r~gime of tutorship was deemed
to continue until the child attained majority. 4
Under the Partidas the tutor had to be sound of mind and
body, of good morals, a major, and a male. 15 However, the
mother or grandmother of the child could become tutrix if she
would promise not to remarry and would relinquish the special
legal protections that the law granted to women. 6 The promise
not to remarry as a requisite was based on the fear that if the
mother or grandmother remarried, her love for her new husband
might exceed that for her children or grandchildren. 7 The re-
linquishment of her protective privileges was required of course
so that men might contract safely with her.' 8
The section of the Partidas on tutorship19 contemplated
testate succession and encouraged testamentary appointment of
the tutor. The testamentary tutor was the first provided for in
the chapter on tutorship 20 and as a matter of law had priority in
the call to tutorship.2' Another indication of the preference of
the Partidas for the testamentary disposition of the tutorship
was the concession made to women by allowing the widow who
made her children her heirs the right to appoint a tutor in her
will.22 This preference for testamentary disposition of the tutor-
ship seems most sensible, for certainly the parent would have the
interest of the child at heart in selecting the tutor and should be
in a position to pick the best qualified individual from the aggre-
gate of his friends and relatives. 23 If no testamentary tutor was
thus appointed, the law called forth the nearest relative of the
13. LAs SIETE PARTIDAS 6.16.13.
14. La. Acts 1830, p. 48, § 9.
15. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 6.16.4.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. 6.16.
20. Id. 6.16.2.
21. Ibid.
22. Id. 6.16.6. The father could appoint a tutor in his will in any case. Id.
3.16.2, 3.
23. In Roman law the testamentary tutor was not required to give security
for a faithful administration. The reason was that "the testator has satisfied him-
self as to [the testamentary tutor's] fidelity and capacity." INSTrruTES 1.24.
(Lee's translation.) The same result may have obtained under the Partidas, but
there was no express prbvision as in Roman law. No attempt is made in this
comment to treat in any detail matters of security devices in tutorship.
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minor to be the legal tutor,2 4 unless no relative was available, in
which case a dative tutor was selected and appointed by the
judge.25
The disposition of the custody of the pupil was not necessarily
coincidental with the disposition of the tutorship.26 The law ap-
parently recognized that while those who succeeded to the pupil's
estate on his death might have the greatest reason to care for his
patrimony, they might have little reason to care for his person.
Thus it was provided that in the absence of testamentary dis-
position the nearest relative would have the guardianship but
not necessarily the custody of the child.2 7 It was also provided that
the child should be "reared up" in the place and with the per-
sons that the father indicated in his will.28 If the father had
made no provision in this respect, the judge was "to take great
care to select some good man for that purpose [rearing the child]
attached to the person and interest of the minor, and who would
not have a right to inherit his estate, after his death." 29 (Em-
phasis added.) As an alternative the law provided that "if he
should have a mother of good reputation, her son may be given
to her, to rear up, and she may retain him, while she remains a
widow."
The Partidas did not provide for family meetings or under-
tutors. It provided a system of tutorship in which the tator was
to be the sole agent of action in the interest of the minor and the
judge was to act as the agent of control by approving or disap-
proving the tutor's actions.30 The power of the judge in appoint-
ing the tutor was probably greater than it has been until fairly
recent times.81 Although the judge probably had to confirm all
appointments of tutors, it is likely he exercised his discretion
rather perfunctorily where testamentary and legal appointments
were concerned . 2 The selection of the dative tutor was, however,
entirely the duty of the judge.33 Also, if the judge found the
24. LAS SIEar PARTIDAS 6.16.2, 9.
25. Id. 6.16.2, 12.
26. See id. 6.16.19.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. For an excellent analysis of the institutions of tutorship and for a com-
parative study of the laws of tutorship in various countries, see RODIhaE, LA
TUTELLE DES MINEURS, ETUDE DE DEOIT COMPARB EN VUE D'UNE RFORME DU DROIT
FRANQAIS (1950).
31. See page 429 infra.
32. See LAs SIETE PARTIDAS 6.16.2, 9.
33. Id. 6.16.2, 12.
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testamentary tutor appointed by the mother or grandmother to
be unfit, he could refuse to confirm the appointment.8 4 When
such occurred the tutorship reverted to the legal tutor, and if
none could be found a dative tutor would then have to be ap-
pointed.
As the agent of action the tutor was required to file an inven-
tory of the goods of the minor835 and then "repair the houses of
the minor,... cause his land to be cultivated, and the cattle to be
reared up."3 6 Having provided for those acts of administration
that in a farming economy were most urgent, the law next out-
lined the duties of the tutor in the care of the person of the mi-
nor. 7 The tutor was entrusted with teaching the pupil good
morals, to read and write, and to earn a living befitting his social
position.8 8 The tutor was to care for the wants of the child ac-
cording to the pupil's means, but the judge was to determine in
advance exactly how much of the produce of the estate should be
expended for this purpose.3 9 If the tutor thought it best that
the pupil should not know the status of his estate, then he could
support him from his private funds and be reimbursed by the
pupil at the end of the tutorship for all reasonable expenditures. 40
Under the Partidas, the minor was required to accept the
tutor confirmed by the judge.41 The person called upon to act as
tutor for the minor, however, could be absolved of this responsi-
bility for any one of the several enumerated excuses.4 2 It is not
clear whether or not the relative called upon as legal tutor could
be required to accept the tutorship if he were unable to provide
one of the permitted excuses. 4 8 However, it was the duty of the
34. LAs SIiTE PARTIAS 6.16.6. This article also provided that the judge
should confirm the appointment where the mother made the child the heir unless
the person appointed was legally incapable of becoming a tutor. However, thejudge could confirm any appointment by the mother.
35. Id. 6.16.15. If the tutor failed to file the inventory he became a "suspect
person" and the judge was required to deprive him of his commission of tutorship.
36. Ibid.
37. Id. 6.16.16.
38. Ibid.
39. Id. 6.16.20: "The judge of the place ought, in his discretion to fix upon a
certain quantity of bread, wine, and money, according to the fortune of the minor,
for his maintenance . . . always taking care that his expenses shall not exceed the
rents and fruits of his estate, which ought to remain entire, if possible."
40. Ibid.
41. Id. 6.16.13.
42. Id. 6.17. Some of the excuses were: having five children, being a soldier
on active duty, being tutor of three persons at the time, being physically afflicted,
etc.
43. Id. 6.16.12: "[N]or having any relation who is willing to be his guardian
.... .(Emphasis added.)
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family, when no tutor had been appointed by will, either to find
a tutor among its ranks or to petition the judge to appoint a
dative tutor.44
The regime of tutorship under Las Siete Partidas did not
totally incapacitate the pupil. The tutor could administer the
estate either in his own name or in the name of the pupil. In
the first instance he acted for the pupil, in the second he only
aided the pupil in his actions.45 The pupil capable of understand-
ing a transaction could act for himself without the aid of the
tutor "if another person should make a contract with him, by
selling him anything, or obligating himself towards him for
something advantageous to the minor. '46 But neither pupil nor
tutor could alienate the movable or immovable property47 of the
estate except in certain special cases and then only with the con-
sent of the judge.48
Changes Under the Influence of French Law
The Digest or "Code" of 180849 was intended merely to re-
state the civil laws in force in Louisiana.5 0 However, many of
the provisions of the Code Civil were incorporated in the Code of
1808.51 With regard to tutorship, three of these provisions
greatly altered the law then in force. Under the Code Civil nat-
44. Ibid. Under penalty of losing the right to inherit the patrimony of the minor.
45. Only id. 6.16.17 refers to the tutor aiding the minor. Id. 6.16.4, 18 lead the
the writer to believe that the tutor usually acted in his own name.
46. Id. 6.16.17.
47. Id. 5.5.4; Id. 6.16.18; see note 48 infra.
48. Azo & MANUEL, INSTITUTES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN 1.3.2, Johnson's
translation found in 1 WHITE, RECOPILACION 15-16 (1839): "[T]he guardian
cannot alienate or dispose of any of the moveable goods or chattels of the wards
without the permission of the judge of his domicile, which shall not be granted
without cognisance of the cause of such alienation or sale, and of its utility to the
minor [LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 5.5.4] ; however he may make such sale without the
knowledge of the judge, when it is done for the purpose of providing a marriage
portion for a female ward [LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 4.11.14]. Much less can he dis-
pose of the real property of the minor, unless it be to enable him to pay debts due
by the father, or to marry the brother of the minor; but then he must obtain the
approbation of the judge for the purpose [LAS SIaTE PARTIDAS 6.6.18; 4.11.14].
And even in these cases, which furnish just causes for the alienation of the real
property, the judge shall not consent to the sale of the house of the father or
grandfather of the minor in which it appears he was born, unless it cannot be
possibly avoided [LAS SIET PARTIDAS 6.16.18]." The provisions as to the house
were not translated by Moreau-Lislet & Carleton as being in effect in Louisiana.
49. The official title of the 1808 Civil Code is "A Digest of the Civil Laws now
in force in the Territory of Orleans, with alterations and amendments adapted to
its present system of government." It was adopted in La. Acts 1808, No. 29, pp.
120, 122.
50. Ibid.
51. Deanow, Introductory Commentary to the Louisiana Civil Code, 1 L.S.A.
CIVIL CODE OF 1870, at 7 (1952).
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ural tutorship started at the death of either parent ;52 an under-
tutor was required ;53 and the family council was the haute tutelle,
or highest agency of control.54 The first two provisions have
gradually become more important in Louisiana law since their
inception in 1808, while the last, after a period of importance,
fell into disuse and has been eliminated from the law.
Under the Partidas, the death of the mother had had no effect
upon the power of the father over the child.55 With the incep-
tion of the French law in Louisiana, however, upon the death of
the mother the father could only exercise authority over the child
as a natural tutor and subject to the regulations governing
tutors.56 This was obviously a recognition of parental authority
rather than paternal authority, and is probably attributable to
the general rise of the position of women in society that occurred
with the French Revolution. 7 Under the new system in Louisi-
ana, the father continued to be the head of the family,58 but the
natural unit of familial control was considered that of the man
and wife.59 Since each parent was considered as an adviser for
the other and as a restraining influence as well, the death of
either parent destroyed the natural unit of authority and made
it necessary for the regime of tutorship to be substituted.6 0 While
retaining the surviving parent as the agent of action, the r6gime
of tutorship supplied the agency of control for the property and
person of the minor, deemed to be missing when one parent alone
survived.61 Tutorship supplied a new agent of action as well as
of control when neither parent survived. 62 Requiring the father
to qualify as tutor after the death of his wife was a great devia-
tion from the prior absolutism of paternal authority. It meant
that the father had no greater rights than the mother in this re-
spect, since under the Spanish law she had never been able to
52. CODE CivIL art. 390.
53. Id. arts. 420-26.
54. Id. arts. 405-19, 452-68.
55. See page 412 supra.
56. LA. CIVIL CODE 1.8.5-10, p. 58 (1808).
57. On the position of the woman in society, see 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 439-51 (especially 445 for the French Revolution) (1935).
58. The father during the marriage was the administrator of the estate of his
minor children. LA. CIVIL CODE 1.8.5, p. 58 (1808). He was also head of the com-
munity of acquets and gains. Id. 3.5.66, p. 336.
59. Id. 1.7.37, p. 52.
60. Another reason for applying the rules of tutorship was that the minor
probably had separate property inherited from the deceased parent. See 1 PLANIOL
ET RIPERT, TRAITA #LkMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 756, art. 2201 (student ed 1950).
61. Id. art. 1982.
62. Ibid.
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exercise authority over the child and its estate after the death of
her spouse without qualifying as tutrix or custodian.6 The pro-
vision for four types of tutors, testamentary, legal, dative, and
natural, has continued to this day.64
Perhaps the greatest change in the system of tutorship in
Louisiana brought about by the Code of 1808 was the provision
for the family meeting.6 Although peculiarly French in its later
development,6 6 its origin is found in the Roman law. 7 The
Roman magistrates had sometimes consulted the family of the
deceased pater familias about important matters in the educa-
tion of the pupil and in the care of his property. This, however,
never became a universal practice and by no means a part of the
codified law.6 8 It was simply the natural way for the magistrate
to get information and opinions that would be helpful in deciding
what was best for the pupil. The provinces of the droit 6crit in
France largely followed the Roman written law and had no fain-
* ily meeting.69 The provinces of the droit coutumier used the fam-
ily meeting, but never as an organized institution of law and only
at the discretion of the judge.70 Thus the family meeting, as it
has been known in France and Louisiana, was largely the prod-
uct of the redactors of the Code Civil.7 1 The office of tutor, while
traditionally referred to as a public office or duty, 72 has always
been primarily a family matter in the civil law.73 The redactors
of the Code Civil made the agency of control as well as the agency
of action a family matter by giving to the family meeting many
of the powers formerly held by the judge. In France the family
meeting became so strong that it was referred to as the legislative
branch of tutorship, the tutor being the executive.7 4 On the other
63. See page 414 aupra.
64. LA. Civrr. CODE art. 247 (1870) ; LA. CIvIL CODE art. 264 (1825).
65. LA. CivIr. CODE art. 281 (1870); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 305 (1825); LA.
CIVIL CODE 8.1.20, § 5, p. 62 (1808).
66. RoDiikE, LA TUTELLE DES MINEURS 18 (1950).
67. DOMAT, CIVIL LAW §§ 1297-98 (Strahan transl., Cushing ed., 1850).
68. Ibid.
69. RoDIARE, LA TUTELLE DES MINEURS 17 (1950).
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. "[T]hey may be excused from tutorship or curatorship as from other pub-
lic duties, for tutorship and curatorship are regarded as public duties," INSTI-
TUTES 1.25. Translation by Lee.
73. 1 TouLLrE, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 308, § 1078 (1833) : "On peut ddfinir
la tutelle une charge de famille fond6e sur la nature, et confirmde par le droit
civil." ("One can define tutorship as a family responsibility founded on nature
and confirmed by the civil law.")
74. See 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ALIMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
585, no 761 (1947).
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hand, in Louisiana, while permission of the family meeting was
needed by the tutor in performing many acts,75 and by the judge
in appointing the dative tutor,70 the family meeting never became
a directive body. Its function was to approve or disapprove the
acts of the tutor, not to direct them. The Code of 1808, while in-
troducing the family meeting in Louisiana, did not provide for
its use as extensively as did the Code Civil or indeed the subse-
quent Louisiana Codes. Although there were chapter headings
"Of Tutorship by Nature, '77 and "Of the Undertutor, 7 1 there
was no chapter entitled "Of the Family Meeting." Under the
Code of 1808 the only apparent use of the family meeting was in
appointing the dative tutor7 9 and accepting an inheritance.8s In
borrowing money, compromising rights,"' making partitions,8 2
and disposing of the property, s3 the tutor needed only the consent
of the judge.
Another significant change brought about in the Code of 1808
was the adoption of the requirement of the Code Civil that an
undertutor be appointed.84 The appointment of an undertutor
was unknown in Roman law and was never a strong custom in
France.85 Perhaps even more than the family meeting, it was the
original effort of the redactors of the Code Civil."" As with the
family meeting the Code of 1808 provided only the most rudi-
mentary elements of the institution.8 7 Little more was provided
than that the judge should appoint for every tutorship an under-
tutor who should act for the pupil when the pupil's and the tutor's
interests became in conflict.8 Not until the later codes89 were
more specific duties of the undertutor and especially the relation-
ship of the undertutor and the family meeting provided for.
Actually, the great rise in the importance of this institution came
75. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 339, 343, 350, 353 (1870).
76. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 271 (1870).
77. LA. CIVIL CODE 1.8, § 2, p. 58 (1808).
78. Id. 1.8, § 6, p. 64.
79. Id. 1.8.20, p. 62.
80. Id. 1.8.62, p. 70.
81. Id. 1.8.65, p. 70.
82. Id. 1.8.67, p. 70.
83. Id. 1.8.57, p. 68.
84. Id. 1.8, § 6, p. 64.
85. 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ±LtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 582,
no 758 (1947).
86. Ibid.
87. LA. CIVIL CODE 1.8.32-35, p. 64 (1808).
88. Id. 1.8.32-33, p. 64.
89. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 273-280 (1870) ; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 300-304 (1825).
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only with the abolition of the family meeting and the substitu-
tion of the present judicial procedure in tutorship.9°
Two other major features of the rdgime of tutorship under
the Code Civil were later accepted in Louisiana. These were the
system of disposing of the pupil's property9' and the abolition of
curatorship of minors. Again the Legislature did not immediately
adopt all of the French provisions. Only after unsuccessful inter-
mediate provisions, perhaps peculiar to Louisiana, were these
concepts of the Code Civil fully incorporated in the state's legis-
lation.
The transition from the Spanish system for the disposition
of the property of the pupil to that of the Code Civil seems to
have been unnecessarily difficult. The Code of 1808 provided a
simple procedure for the tutor to follow in the administration of
the property of his pupil.92 He was to see that two appointed
appraisers and a parish official, in the presence of the under-
tutor, made an inventory of all the property of the pupil.9 3 Then,
unless the tutor were a surviving spouse, he was required to pro-
vide security for his faithful administration equivalent to the
amount of the inventory. 94 This is basically similar to the sys-
tem of Las Siete Partidas, to the Code Civil, and indeed to the
law today.9 5 However, the Code of 1808 went further by provid-
ing for the compulsory sale of all the goods of the pupil, movable
and immovable.96 While the Code Civil provided for the com-
pulsory sale of the movable property9 7 neither the Partidas nor
the Code Civil provided for the mandatory sale of the immovable
property of the pupil. On the contrary, the basic rule of the
Partidas was that all his property had to be conserved.9 8 The
reason given in the Code of 1808 for this drastic departure from
accepted procedure was to relieve the tutor of the burden of ad-
ministering active plantations and caring for movable property.9
90. See page 429 infra.
91. CODE Crvm arts. 450-475.
92. LA. CrVIL CODE 1.8, § 9, p. 68 (1808).
93. Id. 1.8.54, p. 68.
94. Id. 1.8.55, p. 68.
95. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 6.16.15; CODE CIVIL art. 451; LA. CIVuL CODE arts.
316, 317 (1870).
96. LA. CIVIL CODE 1.8.56, p. 68 (1808). The sale was to be at no less than
the appraised value of the goods. Id. 1.8.59, p. 70.
97. CODE CIVIL art. 452. If the family meeting authorized the preservation of
any of the movables they became exempt from compulsory sale.
98. See page 417, n. 48. supra.
99. LA. CIVL CODE 1.8.72, p. 72 (1808).
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The harshness of the rule requiring sale of the pupil's homesite
to relieve the tutor of its care must have become readily appar-
ent, for the modification of the rule began immediately after its
enactment. Two provisions of a statute enacted in 1809100 were
aimed at relieving the harshness engendered by the rule. The
statute first provided that the natural tutor could be relieved
of the necessity of selling the immovable property of the minor
if he obtained the approval of the judge and the undertutor that
it would benefit the pupil to keep the land (a procedure strikingly
similar to the present judicial procedure in all major acts of
tutorship). It next provided that uncultivated land could not be
sold without the permission of the judge and the family meeting.
The first dispensation probably was in recognition of the parent's
desire to preserve the homesite for the child; the second was
based on the fact that the administration of uncultivated land
required little effort.10 1 In 1811 these provisions were repealed
and a provision incorporating some of the features of both
French and Spanish law was adopted. Act 9 of that year pro-
vided that no property of the pupil, movable or immovable, could
be sold without the consent of the undertutor and the five near-
est relatives of the pupil, or if none could be found, his five near-
est friends.10 2 The act also provided that if the will of the de-
ceased parent forbade sale of the property, the property could not
be sold, unless there were unsatisfied debts of the estate. 103 This
was true even if the undertutor and the relatives believed that
it was in the best interest of the minor that the property should
be sold. By the adoption of the Code of 1825, however, the pro-
visions for the disposition of the pupil's estate were brought
entirely in line with the provisions of the Code Civil. Immovable
property could only be sold with the permission of the judge and
family meeting and at public sale. 04 Movable property, on the
other hand, had to be sold unless the judge and family meeting
gave the tutor permission to retain it.105 In France this com-
pulsory sale of movables has been limited to the sale of corporeal
100. La. Acts 1809, No. 21, p. 48.
101. Another provision of the same act prevented a possible impasse under the
provisions of the Code by allowing the property to be sold partly on credit when
there were no cash buyers. Id. at *52.
102. La. Acts 1811, No. 9, p. 30. The term "family meeting" was not used.
103. Id. at 30.
104. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 334, 336 (1825).
105. Id. art. 333.
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movables."" Whether or not this important result has obtained
in Louisiana is not clear.1 7
The last great change towards the system of tutorship in the
Code Civil was the abolition of curatorship in 1830. The division
of guardianship into tutorship and curatorship found in the
Roman law, the Partidas, and the Louisiana Code of 1808 was
retained in the Code of 1825.108 Curatorship has always been
described by differentiating it from tutorship. 0 9 The abolition
of curatorship therefore took away some of the provisions of the
Code which illuminated the regime of tutorship. This illumina-
tion was chiefly obtained in the articles describing the curator
ad bona, the permanent curator in charge of the minor's estate. 0
One difference between the curator and tutor to be noted in the
Code of 1808, but which was not continued in the Code of 1825,
was that "the tutor is appointed principally to the person of the
minor, and secondarily, to his estate; and the curator ad bona is
appointed principally to the estate of the minor, and secondarily,
106. 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt :Lt MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 767, no 2236
(3d ed. 1949): "L'obligation de vendre W'eiste que pour lea meubles corporels
.... le 8ens de 'art. 452 et fixd par l'hiotoire: it a pour origine l'art. 102 do
L'Ordonnance d'Orldana, de 1560 dont la port6e avait d exactement prdc'iS8e
depuis longtemps par t'usage: it ne s'appliquait pas auma meubles incorporels. La
pratique dtait, d cet dgard, tout d fait stable et c'est 6videmraent 4 elle quo lea
auteurs du Code se sont rdfdrds. Enfin la loi do 1880 a tranch6 toute sorte de
doute: non 8eulement le tuteur n'est pas obligA de vendre ces sortes de meubles,
mai8 it n'en a mdme pas le pouvoir; it lui faut une autorisation 8pdciale."
("The obligation to sell exists only for corporeal movables . . . . the meaning
of art. 452 [LA. CIvIL CODE art. 338 (1870)] is fixed by history. It has for its
origin art. 102 of the Ordinance of Orleans of 1560 of which the import had been
established precisely for a long time by usage; it did not apply to incorporeal
immovables. The practice had been in that regard quite stable and it is evidently
to that that the authors of the Code Civil had reference. Nevertheless, the law of
1880 has put down any possible doubt; not only is the tutor not obliged to sell
this sort of movable, but he does not have the power to do so; he must have a
special authorization.")
107. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Schiller v. New Orleans City R.R., 36
La. Ann. 77 (1884) stated, in reference to some shares of stock, that LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 341 (1870) must be read with article 338 and thus that judicial au-
thorization of the sale of movables is required. However, no mention of the
peculiarity of this holding to incorporeal movables was made. The court in Diaz
v. Companie Comercial Mexicana, 168 La. 27, 121 So. 180 (1929) held in regard
to a ship that the tutor must receive judicial authorization not to sell. No men-
tion of the Schiller case was made nor was a distinction between corporeal and
incorporeal movables made. No other cases in point have been found by the
writer.
108. LA. CIViL CODE 1.8.78-86, p. 72 (1808); LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 357-366
(1825).
109. See note 108 supra.
110. The curator ad bona must be distinguished from the curator ad litem, a
temporary officer appointed to litigate for the minor. LA. CIVIL CODE 1.8.79-80, p.
72 (1808) ; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 358, 359 (1825).
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only to his person.""' Article 360 of the Code of 1825 clearly
stated the other differences between tutorship and curatorship:
"The curator ad bona differs from the tutor in no respect
except the following:
"1. The tutor is appointed to the minor, whether he be
willing or not; but the curator ad bona cannot be appointed
to the minor against his will, the judge being bound to appoint
the person mentioned to him by the minor, if such person has,
in every other respect, the necessary qualifications;
"2. Tutorship is natural, testamentary, legal or dative;
curatorship on the contrary is only dative;
"3. The tutor stipulates in every contract, in the name of
the minor, and without his presence, and appears for the
minor in every case when his own interest is not in opposi-
tion to that of the minor; whilst the curator ad bona only
assists the minor in every contract in which he is concerned,
and does not appear for him in courts of justice, this being
the particular duty of the curator ad litem."
In 1828 the Legislature provided that when the tutorship
was natural or testamentary, it did not end at puberty but con-
tinued until the minor reached the age of majority or was other-
wise emancipated.112 As previously indicated, in 1830 the institu-
tion of curatorship was totally abolished and it was provided
that the minor should remain under the regime of tutorship until
his emancipation or coming of age.113 This brought the Louisiana
legislation in line with that of the Code Civil. Although no reason
was given by the Legislature for the abolition of the institution
of curatorship of minors, it may have been felt that emancipa-
tion for administration served the same purpose. Since the child
could be emancipated at the age of fifteen," 4 there was no need
to relieve him of some of the disabilities of tutorship, whether he
was ready for it or not, simply upon reaching the age of puberty.
It is interesting to note that a recent sociological appraisal of the
care of orphaned minors in certain states, including Louisiana,
111. LA. CIvIL CODE 1.8.81, p. 72 (1808).
112. La. Acts 1828 (2d Sess.), No. 36, p. 58.
113. La. Acts 1830, § 9, p. 48.
114. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 369 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 366 (1870).
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has recommended a return in some respects to the principles of
curatorship of minors." 5
Modern Changes
The passage of time has witnessed the lessening of the power
of the father and a corresponding increase in the importance of
tutorship. Under Las Siete Partidas, as in the Roman law, the
child still under paternal authority was never a subject of the
regime of tutorship. With the adoption of the French concept
of natural tutorship in the Code of 1808, it became possible for
the child still under paternal authority to be under the r6gime
of tutorship as well."16 Since 1855, in the administration of the
property of the child, the father has been required to pursue "the
same forms as in case of minors represented by tutors, the father
occupying the place and being clothed with the powers of the
tutor."'"1 7 Furthermore, since 1924 the r6gime of tutorship has
begun not only upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death
of one of the spouses or by divorce, but also with the judicial
separation of the spouses from bed and board.11 Requiring tu-
torship after judicial separation broadens the applicability of
the rules of tutorship and limits the exercise of the paternal and
parental authority. Describing paternal authority in terms of
tutorship seems to be a complete reversal of the original concept
that paternal authority is supreme and tutorship is only a sub-
stitute r~gime for the aid of the minor when he has been denied
115. FEDERA. SECURITY AGENCY, CHILDREN'S BUREAU PUBLICATION No. 330,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, CHILDREN'S BUREAU 178 (1949): "There
should also be a provision [in all states studied, including Louisiana] to permit a
child 14 years of age or older who has no guardian of the person to institute ac-
tion to establish his legal relationship to some person or agency of his choosing."
116. 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt tLtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 1982
(1950) -, "Le tuteur est destind a remplacer lea pdre et msre qui sont des tuteurs
naturels, lea premier et lea meilleurs de tous. It semble done que la tutelle ne
devrait pas coincider avec la puissance paternelle. . . .En droit romain . . . .En
droit Irangais, au contraire, le mineur se trouve soumis h la fois h la puissance
paternelle et A la tutelle lorsqu'il a encore son pare ou sa mdre."
("The tutor is intended to replace the father and mother who are the natural
tutors, the first and best of all. It would thus seem that tutorship could not
coincide with paternal authority. [At Roman law it could not.] In French law,
to the contrary, the minor finds himself at the same time under paternal authority
and tutorship when he still has a father or mother.")
117. La. Acts 1855, No. 324, § 17, p. 447, incorporated in LA. CIVIL CODE art.
222 (1870). But "being clothed with the power of the tutor" does not subject
the father to the requirement of furnishing security, taking and subscribing an
oath, having an inventory taken, or causing a mortgage to be inscribed against
him. Succession of Allen, 48 La. Ann. 1240, 1243, 20 So. 683, 685 (1896).
118. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 246 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1924, No. 72, p.
113.
19561
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the authority of his father. The usefulness of tutorship while a
parent, or at least while the father, is still living has not been
accepted in most European countries. 119 However, in those coun-
tries which limit tutorship to the situation where both parents
are dead, there have been serious limitations placed on the right
of the parents to dispose of the property of the minor under their
control.120 In those countries the ultimate result, it would seem,
is not very different from that attained in Louisiana. Perhaps
the rules of tutorship should be brought into effect whenever the
child possesses a patrimony, whether one, both, or neither parent
is dead. Similarly, if there is no patrimony and a parent is liv-
ing, it might be better not to require the surviving parent to
qualify as tutor.12 '
Although the order of calling persons to become the tutor, as
provided in the chapter of the Civil Code styled "Of Tutorship,"
has not changed appreciably since 1808, significant changes have
been made through collateral legislation. Act 34 of 1921 provides
that "women have the same rights, authority, privileges, and
immunities, and shall perform the same obligations and duties
119. See RODTIkRE, LA TUTELLE DES MINEURS 40, 41 (1950): "Sauf Le droit
anglais, lea 16gislation 6tranggre8 faisant front unique contre le systdme na-
polonion, n'ouvrene la tutelle qu'aprds la mort des deux parents."
.("Except for the English law, the foreign legislations present a solid front
against the Napoleonic system, not opening the tutorship until after the death
of the two parents.")
120. Ibid. "(a) Du vivant de la mdre le pdre en Allemagne a le droit d'ad-
ministrer lea biens de son enfant mineur. Mais it lui faut pour toute opdration un
peu grave L'autorisation d'un organe 6tranger, le Tribunal des tutelles;
"(b) Aprds la mort de la mdre, le pdre demeurd administrateur patrimonial,
conserve les m6mes pouvoirs."
("(a) During the life of the mother, the father in Germany has the right of
the administration of the goods of his minor child. But it is necessary for him,
for all important operations, to get the permission of a foreign institution, the
Tribunal of Tutors.
"(b) After the death of the mother, the father continues the administration,
keeping the same powers.")
121. See 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP fL1MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 693,
no 1982 (1950) : "L'idda d'une tutelle organisde d6s le ddc4s de l'un des parents,
et alors que l'autre est encore vivant, parait tre venue d'une confusion entre le
titre de tuteur et la fonction de gdrant du patrimony d'autrui. Par sa nature
primitive, la puissance patreneLe ne comporte-pas le pouvoir de gdrer les biens de
L'enfant, puisque son principe east l'impossibilitd do L'existence d'un patrimoine
propre d 'enfant, tout ce qui est acquis par le filius denenant La propritd du
pater."
("The idea of an organized tutorship from the death of one of the parents,
and while the other is still living, seems to have come from a confusion between
the title of tutor and the function of the gestor of the patrimony of another. In
its primitive nature, the paternal authority did not encompass the power to man-
age the property of the minor, inasmuch as of principle there was an impossibility
of the minor having his own patrimony, all that is acquired by the son being the
property of the father."
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as men in the holding of office including the civil functions of
tutor, undertutor .... " 112 2 The law declares that the woman has
the same rights as the man. Thus the mother, like the father, is
allowed to remarry without the judge's consent and yet retain
the tutorship of her children.'23 Although according to the legis-
lation, women have the duties as well as the rights of men, the
court has shown no disposition to require the mother to accept
the full tutorship of her orphaned children as it has with the
father. The reason behind this attitude of the court probably is
that women are often untrained in business affairs and may not
wish to assume the responsibility of caring for an estate.
A change in the call to tutorship has also come about by a
changed attitude of the court and a broad use of certain articles
of the Code. Today it seems likely that even the tutorship by
nature may not be looked upon by the court as an absolute right
of the parent demanding it. The court's primary consideration
at present is in providing the best care for the child. 24 The wel-
fare of the child rather than the right of the parent has been the
criterion, especially in cases of tutorship after separation or di-
vorce.125 The courts have seized upon an interesting technique in
divorce cases to permit them to exercise their discretion. Article
157 of the Civil Code of 1870 originally provided that:
"In all cases of separation, the children shall be placed
under the care of the party who shall have obtained the sep-
aration, unless the judge shall, for the greater advantage of
the children, and with the advice of the family meeting, order
that some or all of them shall be intrusted to the care of the
other party.
"In all cases of divorce the minor children shall be placed
under the tutorship of that party who shall have obtained the
divorce."
Since tutorship obtained only after dissolution of the marriage
122. La. Acts 1921(E.S.), No. 34, § 1, p. 38, incorporated as LA. R.S. 9:51
(1950).
123. In re Rhymes' Tutorship, 153 La. 639, 96 So. 501 (1923).
124. See Comment, Natural Tutorship in Louisiana, 28 Tu_,. L. REv. 373
(1954); State v. Robin, 193 La. 789, 192 So. 349 (1939), 2 LOUISNrA LAW
REvIEw 561 (1940).
125. For a recent case in point, see Cannon v. Cannon, 225 La. 874, 875-76,
74 So.2d 147, 148 (1954) : "It is well settled in the jurisprudence of this state
that in cases involving the custody of children the primary concern of the court is
the welfare and best interests of the children."
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and not after the separation, the judge obviously had no control
in the appointment of the tutor in cases under this article. In
1921, by an amendment to article 157, the judge, in all cases of
divorce, as well as separation, was allowed to grant the care of
the child to the parent against whom the judgment was obtained
if he thought it for the greater advantage of the child.126 Article
157 as amended in 1921 nevertheless still referred not to tutor-
ship but to the care of the child. But a further amendment to
article 157 in 1924 made tutorship begin after separation as well
as divorce, and also provided that "the party under whose care a
child or children is placed, or to whose care a child or children
has been entrusted, shall of right become natural tutor or tutrix
of said child or children to the same extent and with the same
effect as if the other party had died."' 27 Thus, in all cases of
separation from bed and board today, when the court decides
which party is to have the care of the child, it likewise de-
termines the question of tutorship. This movement is away from
the theory of tutorship of right, and back to the ancient French
theory,1 28 and the present theory in Quebec, 29 that all tutors are
dative, the judge having the final authority of appointment.
The primary agent of action in the law of tutorship in Louisi-
ana today is still the tutor, but the character of the agent has
been changed in some cases. Historically the tutor had been an
individual in charge of both the care of the pupil's property and
his person. However, since the mother had a right to retain the
custody of her child while refusing the care of its estate, it is
clear that a division in responsibility was possible.180 Since 1902
it has been possible for a bank to become tutor of the property of
the pupil.18' Since the bank could not be tutor of the person, the
opportunity for "split" tutorship was greatly increased. This
provision further changed the nature of the institution of tutor-
ship by allowing a corporation, as well as an individual, to qual-
ify as tutor. There are definite advantages to be gained from
permitting a division of tutorship and allowing a corporation to
126. La. Acts 1921(E.S.), No. 38, p. 42.
127. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 250 (1870), a8 amended, La. Acts 1924, No. 196, p.
307.
128. 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 571, no 743 (1947).
129. QUEBEC CIVIL CODE art. 249.
130. But aee SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA 62
(1925): "The functions of a tutor cannot be divided. The only exception to this
is [the case of the mother who retains only custody]." See also page 415 supra.
131. La. Acts 1902, No. 45, p. 59, incorporated as LA. R.S. 6:322(6) (1950).
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be tutor for the minor's property. Since there is no need for a
solvent corporation to post security,132 the pupil's estate is saved
that expense when tutorship is granted to a bank. Furthermore,
the ability and willingness to rear a child do not necessarily co-
incide with the ability to manage an estate. Although banks as
tutors for the property are subject to criticism for being too im-
personal, on the whole a division of authority between a relative
of the minor and a bank may be beneficial.'1
The latest great change in the law of tutorship in Louisiana
has been the abolition of the requirement of a family meeting.
While the value of family counseling with regard to the major
questions of tutorship is indisputable, the family meeting did not
prove totally successful in Louisiana. The dispersement of fam-
ily members made it difficult to bring them together for a fam-
ily meeting. For this and other reasons the family meeting often
became a meaningless assemblage of persons unacquainted with
the pupil. When relatives and friends of the minor were not
readily available, it was not at all unusual for a tutor or his law-
yer to draft loiterers in the courthouse to be the members of the
family meeting. Their approval of the acts of the tutor was a
routine matter. In an act of 1920, re-enacted and amended in
1934 and 1935,134 the Legislature provided an alternative pro-
cedure for the approval of the tutor's acts and the appointment
of the dative tutor, which, by an apparently unauthorized re-
wording in the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, has become
mandatory today. 3 5 Under this procedure, the judge assumes
the powers exercised by the family meeting in regard to the ap-
pointment and confirmation of tutors. In regard to the admin-
istration of the estate of the minor, the tutor must petition the
132. Ibid.
133. FEDirAL SECURITY, AGENCY, CaILDREN'S BUREAU PUBLICATION No. 330,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINSTRATION, CHILDREN'S BUREAU 181 (1949): "If the
guardian of the person of a child meets the test of financial competence, however,
he should have preference for appointment as guardian of the child's estate." See
note 115 supra.
134. La. Acts 1920, No. 110, § 1, p. 159; La. Acts 1934, No. 47, §§ 1, 2, p.
245; La. Acts 1935(2 E.S.), No. 18, § 1, p. 557; incorporated as LA. R.S. 9:602,
651, 652, 653 (1950).
135. It is highly doubtful that the "alternate procedure" was mandatory be-
fore the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1950. The 1935 act used the im-
perative "shall" before the alternate procedure, while the 1934 act used the per-
missive "may." But in context "shall" as used in the 1935 act was permissive
also. The act of 1935 provided "Said family meeting shall be dispensed with
under the following conditions, to wit: if the tutor or curator shall present to the
judge . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Thus it was not until 1950 that the family
meeting was finally abolished in matters of tutorship.
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judge for permission to perform the acts that previously required
the consent of the family meeting. If the undertutor concurs in
the petition, the judge may homologate the proceeding and the
acts of the tutor may be perfected. If the undertutor dissents,
the judge must have a hearing after which he may decide the
issue and summarily give his decree. The judge may also require
a hearing if he is not satisfied as to the desirability of the act
even though the undertutor has concurred. Whether authorized or
not, the mandatory effect given in 1950 to the previous alterna-
tive procedure would not seem to have made any practical differ-
ence. Since the tutor or judge may still ask any member of the
family or anyone he pleases for advice, the abolition of the re-
quirement of a family meeting has not deprived either of them
of this useful source of guidance. 18 6 In this respect the present
procedure is quite similar to the original Roman practice.
There is always a delicate balance necessary' in the control
agencies of tutorship. If the procedure for obtaining permis-
sion to perform certain acts is too cumbersome, the facility and
probably the quality of the administration may be lowered. On
the other hand, if the tutor is not controlled, the pupil may suffer
from maladministration that the law could have prevented. In
removing the mandatory family meeting, the Legislature may
have improved the system of tutorship. If, however, the under-
tutor approves all the acts of the tutor without investigation and
the judge signs all the petitions the undertutor approves, there
would seem to be no effective agency under the present system
for controlling the acts of the tutor.
Harry R. Sachse
136. For a thorough discussion of the family meeting and the new procedure
see Comment, The Family Meeting and I8 Successor, 25 TutL. L. REv. 237 (1950),
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